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 I. Introduction 
Major famines are rare today, and tend to be ‘man-made’.  Where crop failure is 
the main threat, as in southern Africa in 2002 and Niger in 2005, a combination of public 
action, market forces, and food aid tends to mitigate excess mortality.  Although non-
crisis death rates in sub-Saharan Africa remain high, excess mortality from famine in 
2002 and 2005 was miniscule.  The twentieth century saw the virtual elimination of 
famines caused simply by crop failures.  Indeed, were it not for famines due to civil 
strife or autarkic despotism, mankind today would be on the verge of ‘making famine 
history’.   
The past century also witnessed some of the greatest and most notorious famines 
on record.  Those famines highlight a key feature of twentieth-century famines that 
would seem to distinguish them from earlier famines.  Analysis of earlier famines is 
usually couched in ‘Malthusian’1 terms, the regrettable but likely outcomes of land 
hunger and overpopulation.  Analysis of twentieth-century famines stresses instead the 
role of human agency and public policy: such famines are the product, not of food 
shortages per se, but of the mismanagement or brutality of elites or else the greed of 
speculators.  The distinction oversimplifies the reality, though not the way famines are 
broadly perceived. 
This paper focuses on two of the last century’s most emblematic famines, the Great 
Leap Forward famine of 1959-61 and the Great Bengal Famine of 1943-44.  The first 
involved massive harvest shortfalls, the causes of which remain controversial; whether 
the second involved a decline in food availability is still moot.  The first highlights the 
  1capacity of totalitarian regimes to wreak humanitarian havoc; the second raises the age-
old issue whether famines can stem from a conspiracy of farmers and merchants against 
those who purchased food.  Most accounts judge both famines to have been ‘artificial’, 
the avoidable products of human agency rather than of major adverse shocks to food 
supplies.  Each raises issues common to other twentieth-century famines; and we can 
learn more about both from the history of earlier famines.   
The historiographies of the two famines have followed rather different paths.  
Firstly, the Great Leap famine remains poorly documented, while the Bengali famine is 
amply represented in published and archival sources.  For that reason, no account of the 
Chinese famine has the narrative richness of studies such those by Paul Greenough, 
Lance Brennan, or Rakesh Batabyal on Bengal.2 Secondly, analysis of the Chinese famine 
has focused on its roots in Maoist political economy and on its demographic cost, while 
Amartya Sen’s mould-breaking Poverty and Famines (1981) has heavily influenced 
writing on the latter.  Inevitably, these differences influence the analyses of the two 
famines in this study.   
In what follows, Section II discusses the Chinese famine from a range of 
perspectives.  Section III is concerned with Bengal.  Section IV concludes. 
 
 
II.1. China in Economic-historical Context 
R.H. Tawney memorably described the position of the rural population in 
northern China in the early 1930s as resembling ‘that of a man standing permanently up 
  2to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him’.  Even more than 
Walter Mallory’s depiction of China as ‘the land of famine’, Tawney’s metaphor has 
been elevated to the status of cliché.3    
For the two centuries or so before 1949 major famines in China were probably 
frequent enough to warrant Mallory’s and Tawney’s descriptions.4  In Land and Labour in 
China (1932), Tawney noted that the famine of 1849 ‘is said to have destroyed 13,750,000 
persons’, though clearly no exact number may be given.  Again, although specialist 
scholars have lent credence to contemporary claims that the Great North China Famine 
of 1876-79 killed a further 9.5 million to 13 million, it is unclear how excess deaths could 
have been estimated with any precision at the time.5  Famine mortality probably 
declined thereafter in relative terms, but even so, Tawney noted that ‘in Shensi [Shaanxi] 
three million had died of hunger in the last few years’ and that in Gansu6 ‘one-third of 
the population ha[d] died since 1926 owing to famine, civil war, banditry, and typhus’7.  
These famines were much more than ripples; a more appropriate metaphor for them 
would be tsunamis. 
Parts of China would suffer from major famines in 1935-6 and again in 1942-3.  
Famine in the Yellow River region in 1935 resulted in significant female infanticide in 
1935-6, while Theodore White’s graphic accounts from Henan in 1942-3 describe other 
classic symptoms of extreme famine: famine foods such as cooked elm bark and 
cottonseed, suicides, beggars at every city gate, voluntary slavery, dogs eating bodies by 
the roadside, and even cannibalism.  White reported parents tying children to a tree ‘so 
they would not follow them as they went in search for food’; ‘larger’ children being sold 
  3for less than ten dollars; and a mother who was charged with eating her little girl merely 
denying that she had killed her.  Yet, as is common, not everyone was starving.  Before 
leaving Henan’s capital city, White and a colleague were treated to a banquet by 
Kuomintang officials:8  
  
We had two soups. We had spiced lotus, peppered chicken, beef and 
water chestnut. We had spring rolls, hot wheat buns, rice, bean-curd, 
chicken and fish. We had three cakes with sugar frosting. 
 
 
That was just a decade and a half before the Great Leap famine, which would bring 
the era of famines in China to a sensational end. 
For some time the Chinese famine of 1959-61 remained shrouded in mystery.  
Reports of famine were widespread in Taiwan and in the West in 1960-61, but never 
fully credited.9  In 1969 eminent Harvard sinologist Dwight Perkins declared that a 
famine had been averted despite three poor harvests in succession; in the past such a 
shortfall ‘would have meant many millions of deaths in the areas most severely 
affected’, but effective rationing and the railway meant that ‘few if any starved outright’.  
Perkins was not alone in believing that the regime had ‘averted a major disaster’.10  
Although the Chinese authorities at the time declared that the harvests of 1959 and 1960 
were poor, they denied that this had led to famine.  Only with the release in the early 
1980s of new demographic data by the post-Mao leadership, coupled with cryptic 
accounts in Chinese sources11, could the extent of the crisis be guessed at.  Much has 
been written about the famine since then but even today much remains hidden. 
  4One thing seems certain: this was the biggest famine ever in terms of the number 
of deaths, even if more recent estimates such as those by Peng (1987; 23 million), Yao 
(1999; 18 million), and Houser, Sands, and Xiao (2005; 15 million) are lower than the 30 
million or more that gained wide currency in the 1980s, never mind the ‘figures of fifty 
and sixty million deaths…cited at internal meetings of senior Party officials’ and lent 
currency by Jasper Becker.12   
Figure 1 compares the aggregate crude death rate and birth rate for 1950-69, as 
reported in official sources, with the reconstructed data of demographer Sheng Luo.13  
China’s death rate was falling during this period.  Fitting the official mortality data to a 
polynomial in time and time-squared with dummies for the crisis years 1959-61 and 
adding the coefficients on the dummy terms translates into an estimated cumulative 
excess death rate of 23 per thousand.  Assuming a population of 650 million on the eve 
of the 1959-61 famine implies a death toll of 15 million or so, at the low end of the range 
of estimates cited above.14   
The official data are widely cited by western scholars.15  Yet the only way to 
reconcile the pre-1959 death rates behind the above calculation and UN estimates of 
infant mortality and life expectancy in 1950-55 is to assume considerable under-
registration of vital rates in the official data during and before the famine.  Attempts by 
Banister, Ashton et al., and Luo to estimate excess mortality with data that allow for 
under-registration produce considerably higher mortality tolls.  Though perhaps closer 
to the truth, none of these estimates should be taken as final.  As Carl Riskin has pointed 
out, the baseline child mortality assumed by Ashton et al. inflates the number of excess 
  5child deaths; it also yields an age-pattern of excess mortality atypical of famines 
generally.  Demographer Judith Banister candidly points to the ‘arbitrary estimation 
process’ involved in her adjustments for under-registration, while Luo’s analysis (see 
Figure 1) implies more excess deaths in 1961-62 than in 1960, which does not square so 
readily with other evidence, and a trough in births in 1960 rather than 1961.  Still, a toll 
of 25 million is as plausible as one of 15 million.  Either way, the Great Leap famine still 
remains ahead of its nearest competitors.16   
 
 






















The immediate context of the famine was a severe harvest shortfall in 1959  
followed by an even worse one in 1960, procurements of food from the countryside that 
  6made scant allowance for this, and massive economic dislocation due to the Great Leap 
Forward (see Table 1).  Policy-related factors listed in the specialist literature range from 
consumption and production inefficiencies associated with the soup kitchen regime and 
the people’s communes, and the fanaticism of local Party leaders, to the draconian grain 
procurements of summer and autumn of 1959, and the economic costs of fast-track 
central planning.17   
Moreover, as research on the political economy of famine suggests, much can be 
done to mitigate crises, even in the presence of severe supply shortfalls.18  Clearly the 
Chinese leadership ignored evidence of unfolding disaster at the Lushan Party 
conference of July 1959, and blamed the messenger in the person of Defense Minister 
Peng Dehuai.  They continued to export grain, though at a diminishing rate, and failed 
to import significant quantities until 1961.  They denied the very existence of famine, 
ruling out the option of foreign aid.19  And although the hostility of both the Soviet 
Union and the United States at this juncture were constraints, the Communists still 
made the wrong political choices and were responsible for many million deaths. 
Nothing in the following paragraphs should be taken as denying the central role of the 
regime of the day, both for what it did and left undone.   
  7 













1958    2.5    -1.8   23.2  12.0 
1959 -15.0  -22.6    14.0  14.6 
1960  -15.6    -8.0  -35.0  25.4 
1961    2.8     8.1  -16.5  14.2 
1962    8.5   10.3    -0.3  10.0 
1963    6.3     5.1  12.4  10.0 
1964  10.3   10.3   10.1  11.5 
1965    3.7     3.4     5.5    9.4 
Source: Lardy, ‘Chinese economy under stress’, p. 381; National Bureau of 
Statistics, Comprehensive Statistical Data. 
 
 
The famine must also be placed in comparative economic and historic context, 
however.  First, although it was the largest ever in terms of deaths, it was probably 
surpassed by many an earlier famine in relative terms.  Scholars repeatedly quote a 
range of between 9.5 and 13 million for excess mortality during the North China famine 
of 1876-9, when China’s population was little more than half its pre-1959 level, and 
when (see below) living standards may have been higher.  The excess death rate in 
China in 1959-61 was also modest relative to rates of 120 per thousand in Ireland in the 
1840s or 70 per thousand in Finland in 1867-8.20  The lower rate in China does not 
diminish the human cost of the Great Leap famine, but it matters to the extent that it is 
likely to have affected the famine’s characteristics, in terms of what people died of, the 
threat of social disorder, and other famine symptoms.  
  8Second, China in the 1950s was a very poor country, perhaps one of the poorest 
anywhere in the last few centuries.  Angus Maddison’s estimates imply that Chinese 
GDP per head in 1950 was much lower than the African average in 1980, and lower than 
that of all African countries except Chad (see Table 2).  By 1955 China was still behind all 
of Africa in 1980 except Chad and Guinea.  Moreover, by the same reckoning, even if 
Irish GDP per head was only one-third that of the United Kingdom as a whole in 1850, 
that would still place it ahead of Chinese GDP per head in 1950 and 1955.  Chinese GDP 
per head in 1950 was less than it had been in 1870 or 1890, and less in 1870 than in 1820.  
And China in the 1950s was also much poorer than India in the early 1940s.21    
Third, what vital statistics there are for China on the eve of the famine 
corroborate the impression of economic backwardness.  According to UN data, the 
infant mortality rate was 195 per thousand in 1950-55, and life expectancy at birth 39.3 
years for males and 42.3 years for females.  These admittedly rather speculative 
numbers would put China roughly on a par with pre-famine Ireland and behind sub-
Saharan Africa in 1970 or 1980.22   
 
  9 
Table 2: GDP per head in China and Other Selected Countries 
(in 1990 Geary-Khamis $) 
Country  Year  GDP per capita 
China 1950  439 
China 1955  575 
    
Africa 1980  1,538 
Chad 1980  339 
Guinea 1980  551 
    
UK 1850  2,330 
    
China 1890  540 
China 1870  530 
China 1820  600 
    
India 1942  679 






II.2. The regional dimension and the weather 
China is a vast country, with huge variations in topography and living standards.  
In several provinces mortality rates were virtually unaffected in 1959-61,23 while two 
provinces—Sichuan and Anhui —accounted for nearly one excess death in two, but only 
one in six of the pre-famine population (compare Figures 2A and 2B).24  It bears noting 
that both provinces were infamously famine-prone in the past.  In 1907 the Guardian 
placed Anhui at the epicenter of a major famine; four years later an American account 
described Anhui’s ‘fame of late years [as] only the bitter fame of her sorrow’, and in the 
1920s Anhui was the location of Pearl Buck’s famine novel, The Good Earth (1931).25 
Between the 1920s and the 1940s Sichuan was hit three times by major famines.  The 
  101936 famine, the product of severe drought compounded by civil war, killed up to five 
million people in Sichuan and led to reports of widespread cannibalism26, while it is 
estimated that another 2.5 million died in Sichuan in 1941.  Henan, another black spot in 
1959-61, had been badly hit by the famine of 1876-78, and two million died there in a 
major famine in 1928-9.27  ‘Of all marks on my thinking’, wrote U.S. journalist Theodore 
H. White in 1978, ‘the Honan famine [of 1943] remains most indelible’.  That famine 
appears to have killed 3-5 million people.   
Henan, Anhui, and Sichuan were also economically very backward even by 
Chinese standards in the 1950s.28  Given their fragile ecologies and poor track records, it 
is hardly likely that they would have escaped severe and repeated harvest shortfalls 
without significant loss of life. 
  

































shanghai heilongjiang nei mengg shanxi shaanxi
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The role of the weather in 1959-61 remains controversial and under-researched.  
While Beijing played down the famine, it played up the adverse weather, prompting 
one critic to quip that ‘the Communists call the natural calamities in every year 
unprecedented’. 29  Impressionistic accounts of drought and flooding are plentiful, 
however.  They range from references to thirty inches of rain at Hong Kong over five 
days in June 1959 to a hurricane in July 1960 that ruined 777,000 mu (or about 130,000 
acres) of crops in Shandong province; from people wading across the Yellow River in 
March and June 1960, to more typhoons than in any year in the previous half-century; 
and from infestations of locusts to the following briefing to military students by a U.S. 
China expert:30
  12 
Nineteen hundred and fifty nine, gentlemen, was one of the most disastrous 
years as far as farming is concerned in Red China. Eighty percent of their best 
agricultural area was just damaged with everything—from rain, drought, 
pests.  If you name it, they had it.  They had all kinds of disasters.  It was the 
worst year in a century, in my opinion. 
 
Hard meteorological evidence is less conclusive.  Although precipitation over 
most parts of eastern China was below normal in 1960 and particularly during the 
summer of 1960, with the Loess Plateau and the northern China experiencing severe 
drought, the 1960 drought seems to have been mild compared to 1972 and 1997.31  
Nonetheless, a simple weather index devised by Y.Y. Kueh accounted for 72 percent of 
the yield shortfall in 1960 and 107 percent of the shortfall in 1961, while a recent analysis 
of conditions by a team of Chinese meteorologists based on high frequency data from 
670 weather stations finds that the number of adverse shocks (drought, floods, 
typhoons, extreme cold spells) in 1959-61 was ‘serious’ and ‘unfavourable 
for…agriculture’.32  This analysis also implies that the regional incidence of drought 
broadly corresponded with where harvest shortfalls were greatest. 
 
 
II.3. A Simple Econometric Exercise: 
Backward provinces were most vulnerable to the impact of any adverse shock.  In 
seeking to account for the variation in mortality across China, it is therefore necessary to 
control for productivity or living standards on the eve of the famine.  Backwardness did 
  13not necessarily entail a relatively poor harvest, however: the correlation across rural 
provinces between backwardness, proxied by regional output on the eve of the crisis 
(Y), and proportionate crop loss (DAGQ) was only -0.21.   
In Tables 3A and 3B below, the variations in excess mortality and ‘lost’ births are 
analyzed along lines pursued by Mokyr for Ireland and Maharatna for Bengal.33  In 
Table 3A the dependent variable, is defined as the natural log of [death rate in 1959 + 
death rate in 1960]/[death rate in 1957+death rate in 1958].  Equations [1] to [3] rely on 
two ‘economic’ variables—income per capita (LNY) and proportionate crop loss (DAGQ) 
—while equations [4] to [6] add two ‘institutional’ variables proposed by Dali Yang.34  
These proxies for the political factors mentioned earlier are PARTY (the percentage of 
the population registered as party members in mid-1956) and MESSHALL (percentage 
of the population reliant on commune mess halls at the end of 1959).  Yang hypothesizes 
that lower party membership and lower reliance on communal dining meant weaker 
commitment to those radical policies that increased the vulnerability to harvest shortfall.  
In other words, poor crops were not only a function of the weather, but of also of 
institutional or political factors.  As reported in Equation [3], LNY and DAGQ together 
account for over two-fifths of the variation across provinces in excess mortality.  
Surprisingly, the coefficient on PARTY suggests that, when income and harvest loss are 
controlled for, high party membership density reduced excess mortality, while the 
coefficients on MESSHALL are small throughout.  Measures of the net provincial grain 
procurement rate and of the proportionate change in procurements in 1959-61 also failed 
to pack any explanatory punch.  Figures 3a and 3b help explain why: the association 
  14between the decline in agricultural output (DAGQ) on the one hand, and PARTY and 
the increase in procurements in 1959-61 (PROCUR5961), on the other, are weak.35
In Table 3B the dependent variable is defined as the natural log of [birth rate in 
1960 + birth rate in 1961]/[birth rate in 1958+birth rate in 1959].  The outcome is 
analogous to that in Table 3A: high birth rates during the famine were associated with 
high LNY and low reductions in grain production, while party membership density 
tended to mitigate the impact of the crisis.  Endogenizing DAGQ on PARTY and 
MESSHALL (Equation [6]) only strengthens its impact on the dependent variables. 
 






























 These results could be refined and perhaps re-interpreted.  For example, the 
negative coefficient on PARTY might be explained in terms of areas of strongest support 
for the leadership being best positioned to benefit from state interventions (including 
flows of food).  The results as they stand are a reminder, however, that while earlier 
research has (rightly) identified the role of human agency in the Great Leap Forward, it 
  16is also true that the post-1949 regime had to deal with an economy that contained some 




TABLE 3A. Modelling the Regional Variation in Death Rates 
 
Variable [1] [2]  [3] 














N 24  24  24 
R2 0.203 0.185  0.440 
Prob>F 0.0015  0.018  0.0000 
 
 [4]  [5]  [6] 
























N 24  23  23 
R2 0.283 0.593  0.464 
Prob>F 0.008  0.000  0.001 
Est. method  OLS  OLS  IVREG 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; MESSHALL, PARTY, and LNY (the 
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TABLE 3B. Modelling the Regional Variation in Birth Rates 
 
Variable [1] [2]  [3] 














N 25  24  24 
R2 0.178 0.214  0.397 
Prob>F 0.025  0.001  0.002 
 
 [4]  [5]  [6] 
























N 24  23  23 
R2 0.186 0.499  0.382 
Prob>F 0.013  0.005  0.056 
Est. method  OLS  OLS  IVREG 









II.4. Demographic Aspects of the Great Leap Famine  
Certain demographic features of the Chinese famine are of particular interest.  As 
noted, it resulted in a dramatic reduction in births.  Its demographic cost is often 
reckoned in excess deaths plus ‘lost’ births, and estimates of the births deficit run as 
  18high as 43 million.36  The arithmetic is problematic, however, since births in 1962 
exceeded those in any year since 1951, and in the following three years the birth rate 
also exceeded that in any other year in the 1950s and 1960s.  Indeed, the surplus over 
trend in 1962-65 – insofar as any pattern can be detected from these data – far exceeded 
the deficit in 1960-61.  Therefore, the ‘lost’ births seem to have been ‘postponed’ births to 
a considerable extent.   
Another implication of the data, reflecting a common pattern in famine 
demography, is the proportionately greater impact on the male population.37  In the 
seven Chinese provinces that lost population between 1957 and 1961 there were 725,000 
fewer males and 366,000 fewer females by 1961; in the rest of China both male and 
female populations rose by 1.5 million. 
Demographic data also suggest a role for internal migration during the Chinese 
famine.38  Figure 4 compares the implied patterns in four badly-hit provinces (Anhui, 
Guizhou, Henan, and Gansu) and four that escaped relatively lightly (Tianjin, 
Guangdong, Heilongjiang, Jilin).  By and large, out-migration was greatest from the 
worst hit provinces.  In Anhui, an extreme case, a death rate of 69 per thousand in 1960 
was almost matched by an emigration rate of 55 per thousand.39  On the other hand, the 
data indicate that several less affected provinces absorbed large numbers of immigrants 
during the crisis. The extent to which these movements were state-assisted is hard to 
gauge.  Either way, without the safety valve of migration, the crisis may well have been 
even more deadly.40   
  19Figure 4: Death and Migration in Eight Chinese Provinces, 1958-65 
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  20The final conundrum discussed here concerns what famine victims died of in 
1959-61.  Throughout history most famine victims have succumbed to infectious 
diseases rather than literal starvation.41  Little is known about the causes of mortality in 
China, however.42  Before 1949 it is quite clear that infectious diseases ‘plagued the 
country and threatened many lives’.43  In Notestein’s study of a large sample of rural 
Chinese households in 1929-31, of the sixteen causes of death on which information was 
sought, the five most important were smallpox, dysentery, typhoid, tuberculosis, and 
cholera (in that order).44  Table 4, based on a study of Yunnan province in southwestern 
China in the early 1940s, implies that infectious diseases then played a greater role in 
Yunnan than they did in Ireland on the eve of the Great Famine of the 1840s.  Perhaps 
the most striking differences between the patterns in these two very different places are 
the much smaller proportion of pre-famine Irish deaths attributed to 
dysentery/diarrhoea and to cholera.  Elsewhere in China (e.g. Henan)45 malaria was 
endemic.   
Although Yunnan was relatively poor even by Chinese standards46, the 
comparison suggests that infectious diseases should also have bulked large in 1959-61.  
Could the Maoist campaigns of the early and mid-1950s to improve water quality and 
personal hygiene and impose mass inoculation against infectious disease have had such 
a dramatic effect within the space of a few years, thereby altering the causes of death 
during the 1959-61 famine? Yet popular accounts of the Great Leap famine emphasize 
outright starvation rather than disease.47  By implication the Chinese famine of 1959-61 
was, like those in Leningrad, the western Netherlands, and Greece during World War II, 
  20a ‘modern’ famine in terms of the main causes of death.48  If the public health measures 
taken before the GLF were effective in preventing the spread of disease, perhaps they 
kept the overall death toll—shocking as was—lower than it would have been 




Table 4. Main Causes of Death in Ireland in 1840 and in Yunnan 
Province, China in 1940-4 [%] 
 
Cause  Ireland, 1840  Yunnan, 1940-4 
Smallpox 4.35  6.73 
Dysentery/diarrhea 1.04  14.09 
Cholera 0.19  11.97 
‘Fever’ (incl. Typhoid)  12.69  12.08 
Other infectious (incl. 
measles, scarlet fever) 
12.36 6.66 
Convulsions 5.00  7.25 
Coronary, respiratory  15.23  12.66 
Digestive   11.44  5.54 
Infirmity, old age  19.08  6.16 
Total violent and sudden 
(incl. external) 
3.32 2.32 
Other and unspecified  15.25  14.44 
Total 100.0  100.0 
Source: Mokyr and Ó Gráda, ‘What do people die of’, Table 1; 




A few years before the Bengal Famine of 1943-44, an old India hand confidently 
declared that ‘the old famine of history, with its dreadful death roll, is not likely to 
recur’50.  In Bengal, however, as in China, the era of famines would end with a bang 
  21rather than a whimper.51  The famine of 1943-44 killed over two million people out of a 
population of sixty million or so. Noteworthy features of the famine’s demography 
include a significant drop in conceptions that coincided with the peak in deaths in 
September-November 1943, the persistence of excess mortality well into 1944, and the 
importance of malaria as a cause of death.  As was apparently the case in China, males 
were more likely to succumb than females.52  
The famine was presaged by a series of adverse shocks.  First, it occurred in 
wartime.  Rangoon, the Burmese capital, had fallen to Japanese forces in March 1942, 
and in the following months fears grew that the Japanese would soon invade Bengal.  In 
April 1942 the Japanese sank several merchantmen in the Bay of Bengal, as well as a 
destroyer, and they bombed Calcutta in December 1942.  The usual supplies of rice from 
Burma, albeit a small proportion of aggregate consumption, were cut off.  On military 
advice, officials removed rice and paddy deemed surplus to local requirements from 
coastal districts such as Midnapur, Bakerganj, and Khulna.  They also requisitioned and 
destroyed boats capable of carrying ten passengers or more to prevent their use by any 
invading Japanese soldiers.  This ‘boat denial policy’ compromised the livelihoods of 
two of the most vulnerable groups—fishermen and boatmen—and increased transport 
costs. 
The Bengal famine is the locus classicus for Amartya Sen’s re-orientation of famine 
studies away from a Malthusian to a distributionist perspective. In Sen’s account, the 
trigger that set off the crisis that eventually produced the famine was the increase in 
demand caused by war-related public expenditure.  The crisis was then compounded by 
  22bureaucratic bungling and political infighting, and by speculation and panic hoarding.  
Although in late 1942 the aman crop—which accounted for the lion’s share of rice 
harvested in an average year—was indifferent, in Bengal shifts in the exchange 
entitlements to rice occurred in the absence of any significant food availability decline 
[henceforth ‘FAD’] per se.  There was no 'remarkable over-all shortage of foodgrains', but 
war-induced expectations led producers and grain merchants to convert a 'moderate 
short-fall in production... into an exceptional short-fall in market release' (emphases in 
original).  The famine was due in large part to 'speculative withdrawal and panic 
purchase of rice stocks... encouraged by administrative chaos'.53 While Sen’s 
interpretation of the Bengal famine has not escaped criticism, it undoubtedly remains 
the most influential.54
In the following account I argue that food was indeed in short supply in Bengal 
in 1943 (III.1), and that this was not due to excessive hoarding on the part of traders or 
producers (III.2).  I argue that the incidence of the famine by occupational group is 
consistent with a poor harvest (III.3). Finally, I place the famine squarely in the context 
of colonialism and ongoing global war (III.4). 
 
 
III.1. Food Supply 
When the famine struck, Bengal was even more dependent on rice than Ireland 
had been on the potato in the 1840s.  Rice occupied up to nine-tenths of the cultivated 
area, with jute accounting for another 7-8 per cent.  Bengalis consumed an average of 
  23about four seers [about 8 lb.] of rice per week per adult male equivalent, or at most two 
thousand kcals daily.  This was less than two-thirds of the kcals consumed on average 
by the potato-dependent pre-famine Irish poor; and potatoes were also much richer in 
certain essential vitamins than rice.  Rice accounted for four-fifths of calorie intake in 
Bengal; in coastal areas and in the Ganges-Bramaputra deltas fish was an important 
supplement.55
On the eve of the famine Bengal’s economy, like Ireland’s, was mainly rural and 
agricultural.  Peasant cultivators, either owners or renters of land, were more dominant 
in Bengal, particularly so in east Bengal, ‘home to a predominantly smallholding society 
overlaid by various rentier and creditor groups’.  At the same time, the peasantry was 
by no means an undifferentiated homogeneous class, and the presence of commercial 
farmers and substantial landholders entailed sharecropping and wage labour.56   
Since the publication of Sen’s account, the relative importance of shocks to the 
food supply and the extent of market failure in Bengal have been controversial issues, 
with ramifications for famines studies far beyond.  Long after the crisis became a 
famine, the official position in London, Delhi, and Calcutta was that Bengal contained 
enough food to feed everybody.  As late as July 1943, when famine deaths were already 
commonplace, Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, informed fellow members of the 
House of Commons that there was ‘no overall shortage of foodgrains’, and that the 
‘present difficult situation’ was due to ‘maldistribution’.  The crux was ‘a widespread 
tendency of cultivators to withhold foodgrains from the market, to larger consumption 
per head as the result of increased family income, to hoarding by consumers and 
  24others’.57  The refusal of the coalition led by Fazlul Huq’s Krishak Praja (Peasants’ 
People’s Party) to accept this view had been a factor in its dismissal by the provincial 
governor in late March 1943.  The more accommodating H.S. Suhrawardy of the Muslim 
League, Minister for Civil Supplies from April 1943 on, held that the problem was 
‘psychological’.  An influential opposition spokesman caricatured Suhrawardy as telling 
people, ‘Don’t get panicky.  I am sitting here as the civil supplies minister and telling 
you there is plenty of foodstuffs.  We have statistics which we do not want to publish.  
Everything will be alright. Do not get panicky’, and accused him of minimizing ‘the 
gravity of the situation’. 58  In May 1943 Suhrawardy asked newspaper editors to preach 
the ‘doctrine of sufficiency and sufficiency and sufficiency…ad nauseam’ against the 
‘psychological factors’ of ‘greed and panic’.59  A propaganda campaign targeting 
hoarders was buttressed by an official determination to prove ‘statistically’ that Bengal 
contained enough food.  The propaganda, however, also described the government as 
‘rushing grain ships to India, even from rationed Allies, even at the expense of 
munitions’, an assertion that would have been more convincing had the public been 
given ‘some general idea of the quantum of supplies coming forward instead of an 
occasional photograph of the unloading of a wagon’.60
So who was right?  The Famine Inquiry Commission’s Report on Bengal, published 
in the famine’s wake in May 1945, did not stray far from the official line.  It found that 
although ‘total supply, including the carry-over, was probably smaller in 1943 than in 
any of the preceding 15 years’, nevertheless, the likely ‘absolute deficiency of supply 
[was] of the order of 3 weeks’ requirements’.61  This finding, buttressed by Sen’s 
  25recalculations, has been cited repeatedly since62, but it bears noting that those 
responsible for the Report on Bengal placed less trust in the underlying data than did 
some of its later interpreters.  The only agriculturalist on the five-member commission 
strongly rejected the calculation just summarized, while its chairman, Sir John 
Woodhead, later admitted that they ‘had experienced great difficulty owing to the lack 
of reliable figures of the acreage and yield of the rice crop’.  Woodhead, a former 
colonial civil servant in Bengal and a very safe pair of hands as far as the authorities 
were concerned, also confided to a senior India Office official that ‘sometimes I thought 
that our estimate of the shortage of 1943 was on the low side…the figures were so 
inaccurate—I mean the available data—as to make an accurate estimate impossible’.  
Rather than admit, however, that no precise estimate of the shortage was possible, 
Woodhead opted for (in his own words) ‘relying on quite unreliable data’.  Another 
member later conceded that ‘this calculation was made after the event and of course at 
the time no one knew what the real position was’.63
Others have argued that the quality of Bengali agricultural statistics is too poor to 
support contemporary or historical assessments of the aggregate food supply.64  Much 
has been made of the data, nonetheless.  Supporters of the Report on Bengal position have 
emphasized the limited extent of the 1942/3 shortfall relative to the 1937/8-1941/2 
average; detractors focus on the significant proportional reduction (32 per cent) in the 
size of the aman crop of 1942/3 relative to 1941/2.65  The biggest declines were in the 
west and northwest of the province, a pattern consistent with the claim recently 
  26resurrected by Mark Tauger that the 1942 aman harvest in west Bengal—echoes of 
Ireland in the 1840s—was badly damaged by the fungus Bipolaris oryzae.66  
Confidential memoranda and correspondence between those in high places 
during the crisis imply from early on that Bengal was suffering from reduced food 
availability.67  For example, evidence presented behind closed doors to the Woodhead 
Commission shows that the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, had been warned of the looming 
crisis ‘but was forced into a policy of pretence of plenty to meet the view of the Food 
Department that psychological causes, and not real shortage were at the root of the 
threatened danger’.  The Food Department would ‘not hear of there being a shortage in 
Bengal’.68  In mid-July 1943 Bengal Governor Sir John Herbert—hitherto a strong 
propagandist for the ‘sufficiency’ position—pleaded with Linlithgow: 
 
I must invoke all my powers of description and persuasion to convey to you 
the seriousness of the food situation in Bengal.  Hitherto I have studiously 
avoided overstating the case and I have faithfully reported any day-to-day 
alleviation of the situation: I am now in some doubt as to whether I have not 
erred in the direction of understatement. 
 
‘Unless’, he added, ‘we can get foodgrains into Bengal from the outside…we cannot 
keep Bengal fed’.  There is much more in the same vein.  It was not until early 
September that Linlithgow relented, conceding the ‘strong possibility that we are face to 
face with an emergency extending throughout the Province’.69  Linlithgow’s previous 
  27disregard for Bengal has been widely remarked on; his anxiety that the Woodhead 




III.2. ‘Outcast the Hoarder!’71
In linking famine to speculative hoarding, Sen’s interpretation echoes both the 
authorities in 1943 and the Report on Bengal.  The hoarding hypothesis suited the 
authorities since it undermined demands to divert shipping and food supplies from the 
war effort.  Local politicians were divided on the issue.  Supporters of the Fazlul Huq 
coalition, which fell in March 1943, stressed the precarious food supply situation, but the 
more pro-British Muslim League-led administration which replaced it, and particularly 
its influential H.S. Suhrawardy, Minister for Civil Supplies, clung to the line that 
hoarding was the main problem.  In the sectarian bear-pit of Bengali politics, the 
hoarding hypothesis suited the Muslim League, since major ‘hoarders’ were more likely 
to be members of the mainly Hindu landowning and merchant classes.  The official case 
for hoarding was also vigorously supported by the Communist Party.72
The nature of the hoarding matters.  If it entailed prudential hoarding aimed at 
making a reduced harvest last longer, then it will have reduced privation and deaths, for 
a time at least.  If, instead, it was based on an exaggerated view of the crisis, the release 
of a disproportionate amount of food later (including any carry-over stocks) in the 
season will have led to losses and even bankruptcies.73
  28Some insight into the extent of hoarding may be gained from price movements in 
1942-44.  Between mid-1942 and mid-1943 the nominal price of rice trebled while the 
real price of rice doubled.74  Thereafter it rose more rapidly, especially in east Bengal.  
Neither the rise nor the decline in the price of rice was precipitous.  The quoted price fell 
from 30 Rs. per maund in late August 1943 to 20 Rs. a month later, but that fall was a 
‘mirage’ caused by official price ceilings being reported as market rates (see Figure 5).  
In early September in Manikganj (Dacca district) price controls drove all rice out of the 
municipal market but it was fetching Rs. 40 on the black market; a month later it was 
costing Rs. 60 to Rs. 70, and by October 1943 80 Rs. per maund in Chittagong.75  Market 
prices fell to ceiling levels only in December 1943, as growers reaped ‘the largest paddy 
crop ever seen in the province’.   
 














Source: Maharata, Demography, p. 291; Brennan, 'Government famine relief', p. 544.
 
 
All of a sudden, the huge queues outside public rice stores disappeared.76  
However—and this is the important point—the real price during the first half of 1944 
was still higher than before the crisis.  The ‘glut’ (emphasis in the original) warned of by a 
senior government official in April 1943, whereby the ‘large imports from outside’ in the 
presence of ‘adequate internal stocks’ would result in  ‘a steep fall in prices’ for which 
hoarders would have only themselves to blame, just never materialized.77 The trend in 
prices over the period is also hard to square with the presence of significant carry-over 
stocks from 1942.  A plausible interpretation of price movements in 1943-44 is that, far 
  30from hoarders holding back an unusually large proportion of the available supply, 
many producers were forced to reduce off-farm sales in order to satisfy their own needs.   
The most telling direct evidence against the claim that speculators held back a 
disproportionate share of the 1942/3 harvest is the outcome of Suhrawardy’s high-
profile campaign against ‘hidden’ hoards in June-July 1943.  This campaign, involving 
one hundred thousand committees and thirty thousand full-time workers at its peak, 
located only 100,000 tons of rice held in hoards of 400 maunds and over throughout 
Bengal, less than half of which was requisitioned.78  Asok Mitra, then a young 
administrator in east Bengal, recalled how he scoured the countryside around Viknapur, 
sometimes alone in his pajamas and shirt, for hoarded rice, but ‘the plain fact was that 
there was little rice anywhere’.79  The drive against urban hoarders in Calcutta and 
Howrah produced similarly disappointing results: an editorial in the nationalist Amrita 
Bazar Patrika noted that had it produced more than the proverbial ‘horse’s egg’, 
ministers would have shouted so from the rooftops.80  Instead, they were forced to 
admit that in Calcutta ‘there was no large-scale hoarding by consumers and that the 
stocks held by traders [were] in close accord with the figures they had declared’81.  
Across the province, the rice discovered in hoards represented only a small fraction of 
annual supply.  The ‘drive’ was Suhrawardy’s last throw of the dice: all he could offer 
thereafter was the warning that ‘worse days [were] ahead’.  The failure of the ‘drive’ left 
the poor with a sense of impending calamity, because the actual shortage was even 
worse than they had realized, or had been lulled into believing by propaganda.82  
  31In July 1943 Herbert confirmed that hoarding was a secondary concern, and that 
government-supplied food kitchens were being forced to close for lack of rice.  He 
concluded:  
 
…the essential fact remains that we cannot keep Bengal fed (certainly we 
cannot assume the responsibility of rationing in Calcutta and elsewhere) 
unless we get foodgrains into Bengal from outside.83
 
Leonard Pinnell, Director of Civil Supplies in Bengal until April 1943, was a key 
witness to much of this.  Although privy to reports in late 1942 and early 1943 that the 
aman harvest was poor84, at first Pinnell supported—as ‘any officer with a sense of 
responsibility to India as well as to his Province in a common danger’85 would do—the 
official line from Delhi and London that there was no deficit, and employed an 
ineffective combination of compulsion and moral suasion to keep prices down.  
Tensions between him and the Fazlul Huq coalition were high, with ministers accusing 
Pinnell of being more concerned with the war effort than the plight of the Bengali 
people.   
By spring 1943, Pinnell realized that his anti-hoarding campaign was tilting at 
windmills and that the damage to the 1942 crop was significant.86  His public stance 
remained as before, though.  Ian Stephens, editor of the Calcutta Statesman, described 
Pinnell and a colleague as ‘two unhappy but not dishonest men working to a brief they 
didn’t believe’, whose inept performance convinced Stephens that a catastrophe was 
inevitable.  The tension proved too much for Pinnell, who suffered a nervous 
  32breakdown in April 1943 and resigned.87  In material prepared for the Famine Inquiry 
Commission in the following year, however, he vehemently contested the charge that 
‘Bengal itself is to blame for the trouble owing to the failure to deal with a ring of 
speculators and hoarders who conspired to hold the Province to ransom’.88   
 
 
III.3. Winners and Losers 
Karl Marx once quipped that the Great Irish Famine ‘killed poor devils only’.  
The same holds for Bengal in 1943-44, but the ‘FAD’ and ‘entitlements’ approaches 
imply different categories of ‘poor devils’.89  Who suffered most in Bengal?  Some 
contemporaries saw the large scale migration of smallholders to urban areas in search of 
food as evidence that peasants were not hoarding food; others believed that hoarders—
including landholders—were beneficiaries.90  Given the short-run context of the famine, 
the two-sector specific-factors model of trade theory offers an appropriate framework.91  
That model predicts that a relative increase in the price of food (PF)—consistent with a 
pure ‘entitlements famine’—will increase the nominal wage (w), though less than the 
rise in PF.  The relative increase in PF will also prompt increases in the agricultural 
labour force and food output (QF).  Landlords benefit from both the ensuing increase in 
the marginal physical product of land and the rise in PF.   
A ‘FAD famine’ is captured by a reduction in QF due to a downward shift in the 
production function, so that any combination of labour and land yields less food than 
before.  This results in reductions in the agricultural labour force, and in w, w/PF, and 
  33rent.  In other words, both ‘entitlements’ and ‘FAD’ famines hurt wage earners and net 
consumers of food.  A key difference is that whereas rice producers should fare 
relatively well when only ‘entitlements’ shift, they also suffer during ‘FAD’ famines.   
In seeking to identify winners and losers in Bengal, Sen and several others have 
exploited the pioneering statistical survey conducted in 1944-5 by the Indian Statistical 
Institute (ISI).  Based on the economic condition of nearly sixteen thousand randomly 
selected households in 386 villages, the survey highlighted the precariousness of 
existence in Bengal on the eve of the famine.  It found that average holding size was too 
small to provide the rice necessary for subsistence, and that those groups most affected 
by the famine were already under pressure beforehand.  It also found that the famine’s 
impact was regionally very uneven, and that subdivisions with proportionately more 
families on below-subsistence holdings were more vulnerable to the famine. 92   
Consistent with the entitlements view, the survey confirmed that the landless 
suffered most in 1943-44.  However, landholders were not immune either.  One of the 
most interesting tables in the ISI survey—reproduced below, with minor alterations, as 
Table 5—implies that the occupational status of 400,000 families dependent on 
‘agriculture’ or ‘agriculture and labour’ (or about eight per cent of the total) deteriorated 
between January 1943 and May 1944, in the sense that they were forced to shift from 
their former occupation (e.g. farmer) to an inferior one (e.g. labourer).  Such a 
hemorrhage of landholders is easiest to square with crisis on the land. 93
A second survey, this time of destitute migrants in Calcutta in September 1943, 
corroborates.  It found that while day labourers accounted for the highest proportion of 
  34destitutes, over one in five was a cultivating owner (11.7%), tenant (6.5%), or cultivator 
combining ownership and tenancy (3%).  ‘None of these units’, according to the survey’s 
author, ‘worked as day labourers on a hire basis.  All had enough land to maintain 
themselves throughout the year’.94  A third survey, conducted in five villages in east 
Bengal, also found that agricultural labourers suffered most, but neither landholders nor 
petty traders escaped.  During 1943 the proportion of families owning no land rose from 
29.9 per cent to 36.7 per cent.95
Hard evidence on rent movements is lacking, but that on land transfers during 
the famine is also of interest in this respect.  The famine produced transfers ‘on an 
alarming scale’.  In 1940 Bengal contained 16.4 million landholders.  In the wake of the 
famine, 2.7 million sales of whole or part-occupancy holdings were recorded, consisting 
mainly of peasant smallholdings, and disproportionately concentrated in east Bengal.96  
A micro-survey of land transfers in one village in Faridpur found that one family in 
three alienated part or all of their holdings in 1943.  While some land was transferred in 
order to repay old debts or to buy land elsewhere, most transfers were prompted by 
‘scarcity and food purchase’.97  In sum, the shift into agriculture and the buoyant land 
market predicted by a pure entitlements model did not occur; and the plight of 
agriculturalists and those combining agriculture and labour, as revealed by the ISI, 
Calcutta destitutes, and Mukerjee studies, seems more consistent with a ‘FAD’.98
 
 
  35TABLE 5.  Change in Occupational Status in Bengal 1943-1944 
  Number of families (100,000s) 
  Jan ‘43  Change between Jan ‘43 and May ‘44 
Percentage of families experiencing 
change Jan ‘43-May ‘44 
[1]  [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6]  [7] [8] 
Occup. Group    Better Worse  Ambiguous  Better  Worse  Ambiguous 
Agriculture  33.3 --  2.5  --  --  7.51  -- 
Agr and labour  17.1 0.4  1.5  --  2.34  8.77  -- 
Agr labour  17.3 0.7  0.6  --  4.05  3.47  -- 
Non-cultivating 
owner 
6.2  -- 0.2 0.1 --  3.23  1.61 
Fishing  1.3 --  --  0.1  --  --  7.60 
Craft  5.1  -- 0.3 0.1 --  5.38  1.96 
Husking paddy  1.7 0.7  --  --  4.12  --  -- 
Transport  0.7 --  0.1  --  -- 14.29  -- 
Trade  6.9  -- 1.6 0.2 --  23.19  2.90 
Profession & 
service 
6.8 0.1  0.1  0.1  1.47 1.47  1.47 




2.2 0.1  --  --  4.55  --  -- 
Living on 
charity 
2.8 0.4  --  --  14.29  --  -- 
Total  102.4 2.4  7.0  0.6  2.34  6.84  0.59 
 





III.4. War and Famine 
At the height of the famine the Calcutta Statesman pointed to the uncanny 
similarity between official reactions to incipient famine in Bihar and Orissa in 1866 and 
Bengal in 1943.  In both cases the authorities denied that there was a genuine dearth, 
‘large stores being in the hands of dealers who are keeping back stocks out of greed’; in 
both they refused to recognize ‘advancing calamity’; in both cases disaster followed.99  
  36The 1866 famine was prompted by ‘an extensive crop failure for two successive years‘.100 
In the case of Bengal, the lack of convincing evidence for significant speculative hoards 
and the socio-economic backgrounds of the ‘losers’ support the case for a dearth.  A 
major difference between the two famines, however, is that in 1943 the authorities were 
engaged in a global war that they were in some danger of losing.  When The New 
Statesman & Nation first raised the spectre of famine in India in January 1943, The 
Economist responded with a concise statement of British wartime priorities: ‘The best 
way to end the famine is speedy victory and, however hard the decision, food ships 
must come second to victory ships’101.  
Here again, once-confidential correspondence between officials and ministers in 
1943-44 is telling.102  It reveals Linlithgow telling Chief Minister Fazlul Huq in early 1943 
that ‘he simply must produce more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon even if Bengal itself 
went short!’ and hoping that he might ‘screw a little out of them’.103  It shows that by 
March 1943 Bengali officials were reporting a shortage of rice so serious that ‘the 
available supply could somehow be spread over till the next crop, famine was to be 
expected in certain areas’.104  Throughout the first half of 1943 neither Delhi nor London 
showed much sympathy for Bengal.  By early August, Linlithgow’s tune was very 
different, but that Churchill and the War Cabinet were still unsympathetic, with Amery 
reporting to Linlithgow that his ‘earnest’ representations to Cabinet on the food 
situation had produced ‘not too good results’.  Even then, London regarded 
Linlithgow’s pleas as ‘in the main an anti-hoarder bluff’, and all the Cabinet would 
commit was a measly ‘100,000 tons of barley from Iraq and 50,000 tons of wheat to go to 
  37Colombo to be used for Ceylon or India as the situation demanded’.  Ministers hoped 
that on the strength of this modest offer, but ‘without disclosing figures’, Linlithgow 
would announce that supplies were on their way as required, although Amery 
conceded that he ‘might be compelled by events to reopen the matter within a very few 
weeks’.  As the crisis worsened by the week, Linlithgow, stung by mounting criticism 
within Bengal, declared that ‘it will have to come back on His Majesty’s Government’.  
Yet London continued to prioritize ‘the difficulties of the shipping situation and also of 
the food situation nearer home’,105 with Amery confiding to Linlithgow that ‘famine in 
Greece has been, I imagine, even worse than in Bengal and one of the most urgent needs 
of the immediate future will be the shipping of food into Greece to help the insurgents, 
of whom something like 50,000 are under arms today and playing a really important 
role in the whole war effort.’106
In a letter to the incoming Viceroy, Lord Wavell, Amery recognized the ‘natural 
and widespread feeling here that somehow or other the ultimate responsibility rests 
with us and that this country could or should have done more’.  But he continued: 
 
As to that, you know as well as I do the military preoccupations of the War 
Cabinet and the difficulty of diverting shipping from the first duty of winning 
the war (italics added).  As you will remember, the last War Cabinet decision 
was that the matter should be reviewed at the end of the year.  I am not sure 
that that is not leaving things too late and, if you can manage at an early date 
to visit Bengal yourself, or, even apart from that, feel that you should weigh 
in with a strong demand for earlier consideration, I hope you will do so.   
 
  38 
In public, the official line was still to blame local politicians for failing to control 
‘profiteering and bad distribution’.  Even as late as October 1943 London needed 
convincing that ‘everything has been done within India to extract hoarded supplies and 
get them to the starving districts’.107  So furious was Wavell, a conscientious and 
energetic administrator, at the reluctance to supply more grain in early 1944 that he 
warned that the famine was ‘one of the greatest disasters that has befallen any people 
under British rule and [the] damage to our reputation both among Indians and 
foreigners in India is incalculable’.108
Concerns about war morale also explain the reluctance of the Bengali authorities 
to operate the Famine Codes, even though classic famine symptoms were present, and 
why the full extent of the crisis remained largely hidden from the outside world for so 
long. 109  By the same token, the war accounts for the muted, kid-glove tone of the Report 
on Bengal and its refusal to criticize the authorities in London and Delhi for leaving 
Bengal short.110 War conditions also account for the two-pronged ‘denial policy’ 
described above, and the ensuing disruption of internal markets; the cutting off of 
Burmese imports; the support for accommodating local politicians who would not ask 
awkward questions; and the inevitable impact of the war on expectations about future 




  39For a century and more after the publication of the Essay on the Principle of 
Population, famines in both China and India would be widely accepted as the inevitable 
outcomes of processes described by Malthus, ‘a tragic but inescapable fact of…life’.111   
Not so the Bengal and Great Leap famines, which tend to be blamed, not on economic 
backwardness or harvest deficits, but on human agency.  Malthus believed that the 
problems of corruption and poor governance were largely endogenous, and was 
skeptical of the power of public policy to mitigate famine.  Most accounts, however, 
blame the Bengal famine of 1943-44 on a combination of market failure and public 
inaction rather than harvest failure, while the conventional wisdom on China sees the 
harvest failures that produced the famine as endogenous to the follies of central 
planning. 
In this paper I have attempted to add to our understanding in two respects.  
Firstly, in the case of China, I have argued that more room should be made for the 
supply side factors stressed by Malthus.  I have added more historical context by 
drawing attention to China’s relative poverty and the overlap between high excess 
mortality regions and those previously vulnerable to famine. The famine remains an 
outlier, but to an extent fits a pattern established by the mid-nineteenth century.  
Secondly, in the case of Bengal, I have argued that there was indeed a ‘FAD’ and 
that denying this has led to an undue historiographical focus on hoarding.  True, the 
practice of blaming hoarders during famines is an age-old one: as long ago as 363AD the 
Roman emperor Julian accused the wealthy citizens of Antioch of creating an artificial 
famine in a city where ‘everything is in plenty, everything is dear’.  William Laud’s 
  40pithy judgment, referring to a near-famine in England in 1632, that ‘this last yeares 
famin was made by man and not by God’ targeted similar miscreants.112  The same 
theme often informs literary allusions to famine.  Hard historical evidence that famines 
stem from excessive hoarding remains elusive, however,113 and I would hold that the 
1943-44 famine does not provide it either. 
Not that this was just another example of ‘FAD’, however: in Bengal the God of 
War played a much bigger role than Malthus.  As both Amartya Sen and Lance Brennan 
have noted, harvest failures in the years leading up to 1943-44 had not resulted in 
famine.114  Sen blames World War II for the chaos and uncertainty that gave rise to 
hoarding.  Here I have argued instead that wartime priorities deprived the Bengali poor 
of the food they so badly needed; that they balkanized food markets, particularly in the 
second half of 1943; that they inhibited free speech; and that they delayed the public 
proclamation of famine conditions.115  All of which points to some symmetry between 
Bengal in 1943-44 and China during the Great Leap Forward: official denial was evident 
in both cases, each in the service of what was deemed a higher ideal (serving the 
Revolution or defeating fascism).  As far as the two million and more who perished in 
Bengal are concerned, the conclusion seems inescapable.  They were in the main 
unwitting, unwilling colonial casualties of a struggle not of their making, but a key 
struggle nonetheless, that against fascism.   
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